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Abstract In this paper, we present a study which is the
completion of the problem left open in the appendix of the
paper Nun˜o et al. (Eur J Appl Math 21:459–478, 2010).
The goal of the paper is to offer a deeper analysis of the
type of the ODE system featured in the paper above con-
cerning the evolution of the total wealth and cheater pop-
ulation and, mainly, the purpose is to generalize this one to
a Cellular Automata model introducing spatial and local
effects. The work presented shows the original interaction
between an Ordinary Differential Equations model and a
Cellular Automata model.
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Cellular Automata model  Tax evasion
Mathematics Subject Classification 34A34  37B15 
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Introduction
An ideal society is composed by citizens whom all con-
tribute to the common wealth. The common wealth can be
used for education, public buildings and for all the needs of
the population. But unfortunately in each real society there
are always people that do not contribute to the common
wealth but benefit from it, the cheaters. This is a form of
criminal behavior that can create serious problems in each
society (see [1, 2]).
How can a society organize itself to fight this social
threat? In particular, how and how much can the common
wealth be spent to fight cheaters?
In this paper, we try to answer these questions using
simple models. Recent publications show the growing
interest in the applications of mathematics in preventing
tax evasion and crime [3, 4]. The present work is organized
essentially in two parts. In the first part, mathematical
modeling provides a system of Ordinary Differential
Equations, as in the appendix of work [5]. We studied the
system by tuning the parameters and solved it. In the
second part, we generalized the model in a 2D system
using the method of cellular automaton, a sort of agent-
based model. We confronted the results with the previous
model, and then we studied the effects that arose from
assuming different polities in different zones of the world.
Our decisions depend on the global factors that are
related to the whole society. Examples are the social forces,
defined as external factors which have bias opinions, that
include political advertisements, news reports, laws and
sanctions. These elements are called ‘‘macro-sociological’’
components [6], because their influence is a characteristic
of the entire system. These factors are those which are
involved in a homogeneous system, of which we take into
account in an ODE system. On the other hand, each
member of a population is influenced by the other people
whom each one interacts with. For example, our behavior
is influenced by the opinions and the actions of our
neighbors and friends. These influences no longer belong to
the whole system, but they are local elements involved in
the so-called ‘‘micro-sociological’’ level [7]. For these
reasons, we have to take in account the effects of the so-
called ‘‘micro-sociology’’ and ‘‘macro-sociology’’, to
completely describe the evolution of the society. What
happens when we introduce these local influences? Our
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aim is to build a Cellular Automata model, consistent with
the ODE model, which allows it to describe the spatial
effects due to local influences at the ‘‘micro-sociological’’
level.
Homogeneous case
Let us assume that a society is composed by the following
two classes:
1. X :¼ people that contribute to common wealth
(taxpayers),
2. Y :¼ people that do not contribute (cheaters).
We suppose that the total population is constant, i.e.,
N ¼ X þ Y: ð1Þ
Let us define the common wealth,W, like wealth sustained by
the contributions of law-abiding citizens and from which all
people benefit. This common wealth is also used to convince
cheaters to contribute to W with policies of repression and
education. The time evolution of W is given by
_W ¼ aðN  YÞ  hW  /W : ð2Þ
The common wealth increases in proportion to the number
of taxpayers (a is the constant of proportion) and decreases
in proportion with the expenditures. A part of the expen-
ditures is due to fight cheaters. The parameter / takes into
account these kinds of measures while all other expendi-
tures of the society are expressed by parameter h.
The time evolution of cheater population, according to
the classical population dynamics [8], is
_Y ¼ sðN  YÞ  aY : ð3Þ
The rates s and a are, respectively, influenced by social
promotion and police repression (arrests). This can be
expressed postulating
s ¼ s0
1 þ s1 s/W ð4Þ
and
a ¼ a0 þ a1ð1  sÞ/W ð5Þ
where /W is the fraction of the total wealth devoted to
fight cheaters.
With these definitions, the dynamical system that
describes completely the system behavior is:
_Y ¼ s0
1 þ s1 s/W ðN  YÞ  ða0 þ a1 ð1  sÞ/WÞ Y









s1 ¼ s1aN a1 ¼ a1Na ð8Þ
the dynamical system that describes completely the system
behavior is
_y ¼ s0
1 þ s1 s/w ð1  yÞ  ða0 þ a1 ð1  sÞ/wÞ y
_w ¼ ð1  yÞ  ðhþ /Þw
ð9Þ
The question we are facing is the following: given a social
state, that is characterized by a particular setup of param-
eters, which is the optimal social expenditure that assures
the greatest total wealth with the lowest cheaters’
population?
This question can be solved by studying the steady state
of the dynamical system as a function of / and s. In par-
ticular, the steady cheaters’ number is implicitly given by
the isocline equation
s0 ð1  yÞ  1 þ s1 s/wð Þ ða0 þ a1 ð1  sÞ/wÞ y ¼ 0
ð10Þ
and steady total wealth is
w ¼ 1  y
hþ / : ð11Þ
Let’s take a look at the following remarks:
– / is the parameter that describes how much of the
common wealth the state decides to invest.
– s is the parameter that is related to how the society
decides to invest its money to defeat criminality. In
fact, when s ¼ 0 we consider only police repression
while when s ¼ 1 society’s efforts are totally directed
to social promotion and education.
Figures 1 and 2 depict the tridimensional plots of both the
stationary cheater population and the corresponding total
wealth as a function of / (how much) and s (how). In our
case, the setup of parameters is
a0 ¼ 0:01 a1 ¼ 1 s0 ¼ 0:01 s1 ¼ 100 h ¼ 1 ð12Þ
As it can be seen, the cheater population decreases
monotonically as / increases for all s 2 ½0; 1, the total
wealth presents a peak for a given value of / that is a
function of s.
Consequently, the simultaneous optimization of the
cheater population and the total wealth is not possible. To
overcome this drawback, we can define auxiliary objective
functions and we can look for the couple ð/; sÞ that opti-
mizes the strategy to fight cheaters. For our current
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purpose, a simple, but still useful choice is to study the
function:
L ¼ log 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ









Figure 3 shows the 3D graph of L as a function of / and s.
2D Cellular Automata
We generalize the previous model to a spatial system. The
spatial and temporal evolution of collective behavior in a
population can be simulated with a cellular automaton
model (see [9–11]).
Let us suppose that the population is spread in a square
grid n n as we schematized in the Fig. 4. The total
number N of individuals in the population is
N ¼ n n: ð14Þ
Each member of the society can be a taxpayer or a
cheater, that means, as we have just defined, a person who
does not contribute to the common wealth but benefits from
it. In the grid, if an individual is a taxpayer the point is
‘‘white’’ while if he is a cheater the point is ‘‘blue’’.
Each member of a population is influenced by the other
people whom each one interacts with. Our behavior is
influenced by the opinions and the actions of our neighbors
and friends. On the other hand, our decisions depend on the
Fig. 1 3D graph of y as a function of / and s
Fig. 2 3D graph of w as a function of / and s
Fig. 3 3D graph of L as a function of / and s
Fig. 4 The grid is a scheme of the population distributed in a square
plane
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global factors that are related to the whole society. We are
referring to the social forces, defined as external factors
which have bias opinions, that include political advertise-
ments, news reports, laws and sanctions. Because of this,
we have to take in account the effects of the so-called
‘‘micro-sociology’’ and ‘‘macro-sociology’’, to completely
describe the evolution of the society. Let us first consider
the ‘‘macro-sociology’’ influences.
The ‘‘macro-sociology’’ problem is related to social
forces that influence the whole world. It is a sort of a global
field. In fact, in its definition, we can introduce the possible
actions of a state to control this form of criminality.
Essentially, the possibility of a nation to fight cheaters can
be divided into two strategies:
A To invest money from the common wealth to improve
education and social awareness.
B To make stronger police repression (arrests). Naturally,
to beef up police forces has a cost.
As we can see from the dynamic system from the previous
section, the strategy A is related to the parameter s to
prevent through social promotion the flux from taxpayers
to cheaters while strategy B is linked to the factor a,
forcing the flux to taxpayers trough police repression.
Meacci et al. [12] introduced a probability of choosing an
opinion that incorporates the global factors of the dynamic
system.1 We referred to this approach to link our macro-
sociology parameters with the probabilities of changing
behavior.
We have to define two probabilities that take into
account macro-sociology parameters:
1. PX!YM The probability that a taxpayer becomes a
cheater;
2. PY!XM The probability that a cheater becomes a
taxpayer;
In the case of a taxpayer, the probability to become a
cheater is defined:
PX!YM ¼ s ðs  1Þ ð15Þ
where s is the same parameter of Eq. (4), according to the
strategy A. Naturally, it is clear that the probability Pt that
a taxpayer remains a taxpayer is
PX!XM ¼ 1  PX!YM : ð16Þ
In the other case, if we considered a cheater, we can define
the probability to become a taxpayer as
PY!XM ¼ a ða  1Þ ð17Þ
where a is the same parameter of Eq. (5). In this case,
the social force which pushes a cheater towards a honest
behavior is related to the B strategy of police repression.
The probability PY!YM that a cheater remains a cheater is
PY!YM ¼ 1  PY!XM : ð18Þ
The results under the assumptions are the same as of the
ODE problem. For instance, Fig. 5 shows the goal function
(13) calculated with the CA model.
Let us focus on the ‘‘micro-sociology’’ problem. In a
case of a certain probability P, with the notation P(i, j), we
indicate the probability related to the individual that lives
in the position of row i and column j in the grid. The local
probability to change opinion (or behavior) is proportional
to the number of neighbors that already have different
opinions (see [7]). We consider that each individual (i, j) is
influenced on his own and by the other 8 people close to
him, as we see in Fig. 6.
These effects are called the effects of ‘‘micro-sociol-
ogy’’ which lead to the definition of the local probability.
For instance, let us suppose to define the local probability
P!Yl to become a cheater





– ncl ði; jÞ is the number of people (including himself)
which are the neighbors of individual (i, j) who are
already cheaters.
– Nl is the total number of neighbors plus himself. It
follows that Nl ¼ 9.2
Obviously, the local probability P!Xl to become a tax-
payer is
P!Xl ði; jÞ ¼ 1  P!Yl ði; jÞ: ð20Þ
For instance, in the case of Fig. 7 the local probabilities are
P!Yl ði; jÞ ¼ 4=9 and P!Xl ði; jÞ ¼ 5=9.
Let us therefore define the probability of changing the
current state as the convex combination of these two con-
tributions. In particular, the total probability3 that a tax-
payer became a cheater is
PX!YTOT ¼ c l P!Yl þ PX!YM ð21Þ
1 Differently from the present work, which begins its study from a
particular ODE model and generalizes this one to a CA model
introducing spatial and local effects, the paper cited, starts by defining
an original CA model, compares it with the corresponding ODE
model with effects of contagion and shows the advantages of the
cooperation to fight tax evasion.
2 We remark that people on the boundaries feel the influence of the
people of the other side of the grid. Under this assumption the world
is a sort of toros.
3 We remark that the parameters will be chosen in such a way that it
is a well-defined probability.
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and the total probability that a cheater becomes a taxpayer
is
PY!XTOT ¼ c k P!Xl þ PY!XM ð22Þ
where c 2 ½0; 1 is a parameter that allows to weigh the
importance of local contributions. Essentially, tuning c we
are exploring different types of societies according with the
effectiveness of ‘‘micro-sociology’’ interactions. If nothing
else is specified it is assumed that c ¼ 1. Besides, l 2 ½0; 1
and k 2 ½0; 1 are 2 factors that allow to determine whether
increasing the influence of contagion positive or negative.
Obviously, the probability of remaining in the same state is
given by 1  PTOT in both cases.
Fig. 5 3D graph of L as a function of / and s calculated with CA
model
Fig. 6 An individual in position (i, j) is influenced by himself and his
eight neighbors
Fig. 7 The local probabilities are P!Yl ði; jÞ ¼ 4=9 and
P!Xl ði; jÞ ¼ 5=9
Fig. 8 L goal function in case a with l ¼ 0:40 and k ¼ 0:30 and in
case b with l ¼ 0:30 and k ¼ 0:40
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Results and discussion
In this section, we show the results of the CA model. These
results show that the local effects have an impact on the
forms of the solutions, and then the policies of optimal
choice. In particular, the system is very sensitive if we
decide to promote the positive or negative influence. We
show in Fig. 8 the graphs of L in both cases, respectively,
with l[ k (negative case) and l\k (positive case).
The CA model is particularly useful for studying the
spatial effects of the system. For example, Fig. 9 shows full
screenshot of the system evolution. Cheaters are identified
in blue. It is evident that we can see a cluster of cheaters in
the area where we have defined a lighter contrast policy (/
lower than in other regions). You can also appreciate the
contagion effect in the border area of low contrast.
The effect on the system due to the influence (positive or
negative) is clearly evident from Fig. 10 that shows the
number of cheaters for position in a world where on the left
is applied a policy of strong contrast and on the right of low
contrast. The effect of infection is evident from the blunt
shape of the curve, especially in the vicinity of the areas of
policy change.
In fact, even if we apply different parameters in different
areas of the system, by reason of the phenomenon of
contagion, the effects are propagated throughout the sys-
tem. Let us consider, for instance, the test shown in Fig. 11.
The graph shows the density of cheaters in the world 2
where it is accompanied by the world 1. Notice how the
increase of / in the first world, it produces a positive effect
in the second world.
Conclusion
In this paper, we built a Cellular Automata model, which is
consistent with the homogeneous case that corresponds to
the ODE model. In particular, the CA model takes into
account the ‘‘micro-sociological’’ effects or local effects
due to the influence of contagion between individuals.
These influences are particularly relevant and deeply affect
Fig. 9 A screenshot of the evolution of the system in a world where
in the lower right corner we have applied a lower value of /
Fig. 10 Graph of the number of cheaters for position in a world in
which we applied a low / in the right area. We can appreciate the
curvature of the curve due to the effect of contagion
Fig. 11 Graph of the density of cheaters in the world with increasing
/ of the attached world. When the / of the attached world grows it
produces a positive effect also on the world reported in the graph as a
result of contagion
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the behavior of the system. Thanks to these influences we
can study the spatial effects as shown in the ‘‘Results’’
section.
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